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guaranty made effective. In addition, the debts owed to the bank
from the sale of the drafts would also be attachable. The court's
holding that these drafts were not a property within the meaning
of CPLR 5201 and thus not subject to attachment appears
justifiable.
CPLR 5208:

Enforcement after death of judgment debtor;
leave of court.

In In re Casey's Estate,200 the administratrix of an estate commenced a proceeding in the surrogate's court to vacate a restraining
notice issued pursuant to CPLR 5222 to enforce a judgment obtained against the debtor's representative. The creditor's contention,
that the surrogate's court lacked the authority to grant such relief,
was rejected and the notice vacated. In so doing, the court
noted that CPLR 5208 prohibits the enforcement of a money judgment after the death of the debtor without leave of the surrogate's
court which granted letters of administration upon the estate.
The court noted that, without the surrogate's leave, Article 52
enforcement procedures are not effective against the property of the
deceased when the judgment was obtained prior to his death but
where execution was delayed until after death. The court reasoned,
therefore, that no greater relief should be afforded a creditor whose
judgment was obtained initially against the deceased's representative.
CPLR 5222: Restraining Notices.
In

Sumitomo Shoji v. Chemical Bank N.Y.

20 1
Trust Co.,

the court was presented with the issue of determining the effectiveness
of a restraining notice served upon a bank. The restraining notice
specified several accounts, two of which were corporate checking
accounts not in the judgment debtor's name. Subsequently, the
bank honored checks signed and made payable to "cash" by the
debtor which closed out these corporate checking accounts. The
bank contended that since there had been no adjudication as to
the judgment debtor's interest in these accounts, it was obligated
20 2
to honor the checks or suffer liability for wrongful dishonor.
The court held that by disregarding the restraining notice, the bank
assumed the risk of liability if the creditor could establish that the
corporate accounts constituted property of the debtor. The court
then directed that this issue be set for trial.
The creditor subsequently moved to reargue the question of
the bank's liability, setting up a summary judgment obtained pursuant
20046

1965).

Misc. 2d 776, 260 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Surr. Ct. Rensselaer County

20147 Misc. 2d 741, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
202 N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 4-302, 4-402.
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to CPLR 3213 against the corporations whose accounts were
involved. This judgment held that the judgment debtor treated
the corporate monies exclusively as his own. The court denied the
motion to reargue on the ground that the bank was not bound by
this determination since it was not a party to the action in which
summary judgment was granted.
The bank also moved for reargument contending first, that the
issue of ownership could not be resolved in a special proceeding,
and secondly, that the restraining notice was ineffective as of the
time of its service.
The court, in denying the bank's motion, held that the special
proceeding had been properly brought. CPLR 5225 and 5227
changed
prior law which required a plenary action to determine
20 3
rights.
In accordance with CPLR 5222,24 the court held the restraining
notice effective as of the date of issue. In so doing, the court
extensively investigated the legislative history of CPLR 5222 and
concluded that the creditor's specification of a debt or property in a
restraining notice is binding on the person served to prohibit
alienation except upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to court
order.
In regard to the issue of possible liability of the bank for
wrongful dishonor, the court observed that since the bank is restrained pursuant to a statute subsequent to the one creating
liability, the dishonor cannot be classified as wrongful. In addition,
CPLR 5222 (b) expressly provides that the creditor who served the
restraining notice shall be liable to the true owner of the property
(if other than the judgment debtor) for any damages sustained
because of the restraint.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the bank contended that
under Section 134(5) of the Banking Law, notice of an adverse
claim to an account was not effective unless the claimant followed
certain procedures including posting a bond. The purpose of the
statute is to protect banks against double liability. 20 5

The court

stated that the instant case did not constitute an adverse claim
since the bank was not requested to make any type of disbursement.
It was only prohibited from transferring the funds without court
approval.
203

Ruvolo v. Long Island R-R.,

45 Misc. 2d 136, 256 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup-

Ct Queens County 1965); SIXTH REP. 486; 7B McKnNNLY's CPLR 5225,

supp. commentary 26 (1965).
204 CPLR 5222(b) provides in part: "A restraining notice served upon a
person other than the judgment debtor is effective only if, at the time of
service . . . the judgment creditor has stated in the notice that a specified
debt is owed by the person served to the judgment debtor. ..."
205 Leeds v. Guaranty Trust Co., 193 Misc. 681, 682, 85 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
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The instant case provides an excellent illustration of the usefulness of the restraining notice as an enforcement device. CPLR
5222(a) provides that a restraining notice may be issued by the
clerk of the court or by the attorney of the judgment creditor as an
officer of the court. The practitioner should note, however, that
under City of New York v. Panzirer,20 6 mere service of the restraining notice does not effectuate a priority for the judgment.
CPLR 5227: Payments of debts owed to judgment
debtor-priority.
In the case of Neilson Realty Corp. v. MVAIC, 207 the petitioner
comnienced a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5227 to satisfy
its judgment against the debtor out of a recovery which the debtor
obtained against MVAIC. A cross application under CPLR 5240
was made by an interested party for an order directing that the
fund involved be distributed in accordance with" the following
priority: first, to satisfy the attorney's fee and disbursements
involved in the litigation against MVAIC; secondly, to satisfy the
liens of the insurance company which provided workmen's compensation payments to the debtor pursuant to Section 227(1) of the
Workmen's Compensation Law; thirdly, to satisfy the lien of the
hospital pursuant to Section 189(1) of the Lien Law, which
provided medical services to the debtor; fourthly, to two physicians;
and lastly, to the Department of Welfare, all of whom claimed
rights via the debtor's assignment of the proceeds of the personal
injury cause of action. The court followed this proposed order of
priority. By so doing, the fund was exhausted, thus leaving Neilson,
the party who commenced the special proceeding, with nothing.
In its opinion, the court noted that the debtor's claim for
personal injuries did not become a debt within the meaning of
CPLR 5201 until the damages were fixed. 208 Thus, when Neilson
served a restraining notice (CPLR 5222(b)) and subpoena on
MVAIC approximately one month after the fixing of damages, it
affected only that amount of the debt which belonged to the debtor.
The court stated, however, that such activities made Neilson a
judgment lienor.209 This statement is not in accord with CPLR
5234 or with a recent case construing this section.21° These
authorities hold that priority among judgment creditors is deter20823
207 47

App. Div. 2d 158, 259 N.Y.S2d 284 (lst Dep't 1965).
Misc. 2d 260, 262 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Queens Couhty 1965).

208 Wallace v. Ford, 44 Misc. 2d 313, 253 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County
1964).
209
Neilson Realty Corp. v. MVAIC, 47 Misc. 2d 260, 263, 262 N.Y.S2d
652, 657 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
210 City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 259 N.Y.S2d
284 (1st Dept 1965).

